Juliana v. United States by Reed, Anthony
Public Land & Resources Law Review 
Volume 0 Case Summaries 2019-2020 Article 11 
4-14-2020 
Juliana v. United States 
Anthony Reed 
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana, anthony.reed@umontana.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law 
Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Natural Resources Law 
Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Water 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Reed, Anthony (2020) "Juliana v. United States," Public Land & Resources Law Review: Vol. 0 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss10/11 
This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum 
@ Montana Law. 
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) 
 
Anthony P. Reed 
 
 Plaintiffs sued the United States government for promoting activ-
ities that were known to pollute the atmosphere and cause climate change. 
They claimed the government’s policies violated their rights under the 
substantive due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the equal protec-
tion clause of the Ninth Amendment, and the public trust doctrine. The 
Ninth Circuit held it was not within the court’s Article III power to create 
and oversee a comprehensive plan capable of redressing the Plaintiffs’ in-
juries and, therefore, Plaintiffs lacked standing. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 A group of twenty one young citizens, an environmental non-
profit, and a “representative of future generations” (collectively “Plain-
tiffs”), brought an action alleging the federal government (“Defendant”) 
violated their constitutional right to a “climate system capable of sustain-
ing human life.”1 Plaintiffs sought an order compelling the government to 
develop a plan that would eliminate fossil fuel emissions and restore at-
mospheric levels of carbon dioxide to preindustrial levels.2  
Defendants argued the claim should have been dismissed because 
Plaintiffs should have sought a remedy under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (“APA”).3 The court assumed, without examination, the right as-
serted by Plaintiffs existed under the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.4 The court held that the APA was not an appropriate avenue 
for relief because Plaintiffs did not allege that an agency took discrete ac-
tion in excess of its statutory authority.5 Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not 
allege that any discrete agency action was arbitrary and capricious.6 Ulti-
mately, the court held the Plaintiffs’ claim could not survive summary 
judgment because the court did not have the constitutional power to issue 
the redress Plaintiffs sought.7 The court advised Plaintiffs to instead seek 
relief through the political process.8 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the United States District Court 
for the District of Oregon where they alleged constitutional violations of: 
“(1) the [P]laintiffs’ substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of 
 
1.  Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2020). 
2. Id. at 1164–65. 
3.  Id. at 1167. 
4. Id. at 1164.  
5. Id. at 1167 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C) (2018)).  
6.  Id. at 1167. 
7. Id. at 1164. 
8.  Id. at 1165. 
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the Fifth Amendment; (2) the [P]laintiffs’ rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment to equal protection of the law; (3) the [P]laintiffs’ rights under the 
Ninth Amendment; and (4) the public trust doctrine.”9 The district court 
denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding the Plaintiffs had stand-
ing and the matter was justiciable.10 However, the district court, acting on 
a motion for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings filed by 
the Defendants, granted summary judgment to the Defendants on the Ninth 
Amendment claim and dismissed the equal protection claim in part.11 De-
fendant’s interlocutory appeal was granted in part and denied in part by 
the Ninth Circuit.12 
  
III. ANALYSIS 
 
 The Ninth Circuit first examined, and dismissed, the Defendant’s 
argument that the Plaintiffs should have brought suit under the APA.13 
Next, the court discussed the issue of standing, finding that two of the three 
requirements were met.14 Finally, the court concluded the Plaintiffs’ claim 
was ultimately a political question.15 
 
A. The Administrative Procedure Act 
 
  Defendant did not contend climate change, its effect, or its cause, 
but instead argued that Plaintiffs were required to bring their claim under 
the APA.16 The government argued that because the APA is a “compre-
hensive remedial scheme” used to contest the constitutionality of agency 
actions, all of the Plaintiffs’ claims should have been brought under it, and 
the freestanding constitutional claims should therefore be barred.17 How-
ever, the court disagreed on the grounds that, if it were to follow the De-
fendant’s interpretation of the APA and force all constitutional claims to 
proceed through that statutory mechanism, then it would prevent plaintiffs 
from ever challenging constitutional violations when the violation was not 
the result of a discrete agency action.18  
In order for a claim to be appropriately brought under the APA, a 
plaintiff must allege a discrete agency action either exceeded its statutory 
authorization or was arbitrary and capricious.19 Here, the Plaintiffs’ claim 
 
9. Id. at 1165.  
10. Id.  
11. Id.  
12. Id. at 1166. 
13. Id. 
14.  Id. at 1175. 
15.  Id. at 1173. 
16.  Id. at 1167. 
17.  Id.  
18.  Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 694, 696 (9th Cir. 
2019); Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of the Interior, 876 F. 3d 1144,1172 (9th Cir. 2017)).  
19. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), (C)). 
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did not allege a discrete agency action.20 The court further reasoned that if 
an act of Congress intends to judicially control a colorable constitutional 
claim, they must explicitly state that intention in the act and the APA con-
tains no such language.21 Thus, the court held that the Plaintiffs were not 
required to bring their constitutional claims under the APA.22 
 
B. Article III Standing 
 
 Plaintiffs were unable to show they had adequate Article III stand-
ing to bring their claims.23 To establish standing, a plaintiff must show (1) 
a concrete and particularized injury that (2) is caused by the challenged 
conduct and (3) is likely redressable by a favorable judicial decision.24 To 
survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must merely show the existence of 
a genuine dispute as to the requirements.25 
 
1. Injury In-Fact 
 
 The court held that several Plaintiffs were able to show concrete 
and particularized injuries that were neither conjectural nor hypothetical.26 
The court noted that one Plaintiff was forced off her homeland and sepa-
rated from her family on the Navajo Reservation because of water scar-
city.27 Having to leave one’s home qualified, in the court’s eyes, as a con-
crete and particularized injury.28 Another Plaintiff had been evacuated 
multiple times from his coastal home due to flooding.29 The court stated 
this too was a concrete and particularized injury resulting from climate 
change, and that Plaintiffs will likely to continue to experience effects if it 
is left unchecked.30  
Nevertheless, the Defendant argued that because climate change 
affects everyone, the Plaintiffs’ claims could not be particularized.31 The 
court noted, however, that “it does not matter how many persons have been 
injured if the plaintiffs’ injuries are concrete and personal.”32 Additionally, 
 
20.  Id.  
21. Id. (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603, (1988) (internal quo-
tations omitted); Allen v. Milas, 896 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2018)). 
22. Id. at 1166. 
23.  Id. at 1168. 
24. Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000); Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 
2011)). 
25.  Id. (citing Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 
938, 947 (9th Cir. 2002)).  
26.  Id. 
27. Id.  
28. Id.  
29.  Id. 
30. Id.  
31.  Id.  
32.  Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007)). 
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4 
“the fact that a harm is widely shared does not necessarily render it a gen-
eralized grievance.”33 The injury requirement is met provided at least one 
person has suffered a concrete harm.34 
 
2. Causation 
 
 The court acknowledged that Plaintiffs had compiled a convincing 
record that left little doubt climate change is occurring, accelerating, 
caused in part by fossil fuel combustion, and will have dire effects on the 
planet if left unconstrained.35  
However, Defendant argued that because carbon dioxide entered 
the atmosphere by the actions of third-parties, the causal chain was too 
attenuated.36 The court disagreed, and reasoned that even if multiple links 
in the chain of causation exist, causation can still be established if the chain 
is not so long that it rises to a level regarded as merely hypothetical or 
tenuous.37 The court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently established the causal 
chain with evidence that showed emissions from fossil fuel production, 
extraction, and transportation caused their injuries.38 The court stated the 
Plaintiffs adequately showed their claims could survive summary judg-
ment as to governmental causation through federal policy, including sub-
sidies, leases, and authorizations which increased carbon dioxide emis-
sions over the past fifty years.39 
 
3. Redressability 
 
 The court began its redressability analysis by stressing that Plain-
tiffs did not claim a statutory, regulatory, or procedural violation, nor was 
their claim was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.40 Fundamen-
tally, Plaintiffs claim was that the government deprived them of a substan-
tive constitutional right to a “climate system capable of sustaining human 
life.”41 The court noted that whether or not this right existed was for a jury 
 
33.  Id. (quoting Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 
2015)). 
34. Id. (citing Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2416 (2018); Town of 
Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc. 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017)).  
35.  Id. at 1166. 
36. Id. at 1169.  
37.  Id. (citing Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Maya v. Centex Corp. 658 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011)).  
38.  Id.  
39.  Id.  
40. Id.  
41.  Id.  
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5 
to decide; however, for purposes of examining standing, the court assumed 
a jury would find the right existed.42  
Plaintiffs sought redress in the form of declaratory and injunctive 
relief.43 The court stated the question of redressability is twofold and a 
plaintiff must show relief is both “(1) substantially likely to redress their 
injuries; and (2) within the district court’s power to award.”44 A plaintiff 
need not show redress is guaranteed, only that it is more than merely spec-
ulative.45  
 Plaintiffs sought a declaration from the government stating that it 
had violated the Constitution.46 The court observed this remedy would be 
unlikely to redress the Plaintiffs’ injuries, although it may benefit them 
psychologically.47 Psychological remedies may be attached to redressabil-
ity but are not acceptable as the sole remedy to establish Article III stand-
ing.48 
 Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief in the form an order pre-
venting the government from permitting, authorizing, and subsidizing fos-
sil fuel use and to create a plan, approved by the judiciary, that reduces the 
country’s carbon footprint.49 The court reasoned such a plan would be 
problematic because it would prevent the Executive from exercising its 
discretion expressly granted by Congress, and prevent Congress from ex-
ercising power expressly granted by the Constitution.50 The court ex-
pounded further that the Plaintiffs’ experts had not shown that action taken 
by the United States to eliminate pro-fossil fuel programs would suffi-
ciently reduce global carbon dioxide levels and prevent further injury.51 
The court made clear that the Plaintiffs’ experts acknowledged much more 
would be required to curb the effects of climate change including “a fun-
damental transformation of this country’s energy system.”52 
 The court held that even if the proposed relief would reduce the 
likelihood of further injury to the Plaintiffs, the redressability requirement 
was still not satisfied.53 A remedy that merely ameliorates a plaintiff’s in-
 
42. Id. (comparing Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 
237, 250–53 (E.D. Pa. 2019) with Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d, 1248–50 
(D. Or. 2016)).  
43.  Id. at 1169. 
44  Id. at 1170 (citing M.S. v. Brown, 902 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 
2018) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).  
45.  Id. (citing Clean Air Council v. United States, 362 F. Supp. 3d 237 
(E.D. Pa. 2019); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)). 
46.  Id.  
47.  Id.  
48. Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), 
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000)). 
49.  Id.  
50. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2).  
51.  Id.  
52. Id. at 1171.  
53.  Id.  
 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW Vol. 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
juries is only available to those who have suffered a deprivation of a pro-
cedural right.54 Notably, in Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court 
found redressability because “there [was] some possibility that the re-
quested relief [would] prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the 
decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.”55 
 Finally, the court found the injunctive relief Plaintiffs sought was 
beyond the power of an Article III court because it required a comprehen-
sive, complex plan which could not be ordered, designed, supervised, or 
implemented by the judiciary.56 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
  Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their attempt to obtain a ruling on 
the merits of their challenge to the United States’ reliance on fossil fuels. 
Had the Plaintiffs brought additional claims as the court noted, or if they 
had a simpler solution to the problem, the court may have been more re-
ceptive to their suit. This claim was novel, but likely to serve as an exam-
ple for those concerned with the state of the environment who seek to bring 
similar suits in the future. 
 
  
 
54. Id. 
55. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007)). 
56.  Id. (citing M.S. v. Brown, 902 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2019)). 
